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#CIVILRIGHTSCYBERTORTS: UTILIZING TORTS TO COMBAT

HATE SPEECH INONLINE

SOCIAL MEDIA

Johnny Holschuh*
"The Nigger scores again we riot #JoelWard"-brendmaitland
25/Apr/2012 07:41:41 PM PDT
"Nigger I hope you get hung #pusssy #bruinsbitch"
RealSteezyDubz 25/Apr/2012 07:26:53 PM PDT
"Fucking stupid arrogant,smelly, useless, waste of life, sad excuse
for a NHL hockey FlayingNIGGER!!!! "--Grizzlymarshall 25/Apr/2012
07:32:18 PM PDT
These tweets are only a few examples of many posted to Twitter after
African-American Washington Capitals winger Joel Ward scored the
game-winning goal in overtime against the Boston Bruins in game seven
of the first round of the 2012 NHL Stanley Cup Playoffs. 2 Hate speech
like this is not uncommon on Twitter,3 and is not limited to public
figures.4 Nor is it limited to Twitter, as when college students attacked a
Hispanic student via Facebook, threatening "to come find [him] and
drag [him] behind [their] (expletive) car."5 The rise of Twitter and
Facebook provide new and unique forums through which individuals
can target other individuals and spread hate, fear, and intimidation. The
damage caused by social media hate speech is not trivial and can cause
* For PaPa, who inspired me to fight for justice when the scales are tipped; for Grandpa, who
instilled in me the bravery to explore the darkness; for Pops, who trained me to practice the law with
integrity; for Mama, whose love and support gives me the confidence to speak loudly; for Heather, who
taught me to search for justice in love and compassion; and for Jake, whose light of life always leads me
out of the darkness when I need to rest. I would like to thank Hannah Brooks for her help with the idea
for this article, the editors of this article for their guidance, Professor Bryant for his advice on my
constitutional law analysis, and Stu MacDonald for his patience and general awesomeness as a
roommate. Any and all errors are attributable to the author alone.
1. robbercat, Bruins Fans CallingJoel Ward the N-Word, CHIRPSTORY (Apr. 25, 2012, 8:19
PM), http://chirpstory.com/li/6781#.
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., Ugonna Okpalaoka, Map Shows South Has Most Racist Post-Election Obama
Tweets, THE GRIO (Nov. 12, 2012, 4:46 PM), http://thegrio.com/2012/1 1/12/map-shows-south-hasmost-racist-post-election-obama-tweets/ (reporting on the racist tweets posted after Barack Obama won
the 2012 election).
4. The requirement that plaintiffs in defamation suits arising out of public speech must present
proof of malice is presumed irrelevant here, both because most victims will be private figures and
because racial epithets and hate speech against individuals do not address matters of public concern.
See Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REv. 61, 109-11 (2009).
5. Id. at 79 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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serious physical, emotional, and economic harm to victims.
This Comment explores if, and how, tort law can be utilized to
provide remedies to victims of social media hate speech. Proceeding
under the belief that racial insults should have no First Amendment
protection,6 the Comment will examine how social media facilitates hate
speech and the extent to which tort law has evolved to combat this
malicious communication. It will address how torts can be used to
combat three of the four major types of hate speech proscribed by
governments: slurs against racial, religious, ethnic, or LGBT groups;
incitement to racial, religious, ethnic, or LGBT violence; and hostile
work or educational environments for racial, religious, ethnic, and
LGBT minorities.7 Although this author is unaware of any cases in
which tort claims have been utilized to combat hate speech through
social media, tort law may provide a unique mechanism for combating
these novel assaults.
Part II of this Comment offers a background to Facebook and Twitter
and the use of hate speech in social media. Part III provides an
overview of the jurisprudence of Internet tort law and discusses the
challenges of pursuing social media litigation, including the availability
and limitations of damages. It then analyzes the practical viability of
social media hate speech claims and provides a recommendation for
legislatures to improve victims' access to civil remedies. Part IV
discusses possible causes of action that can be utilized to sue individuals
6. See Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and
Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 133, 172-79 (1982). Additionally, under international law,
Article 4 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
requires that states "declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial
superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of violence or incitement to
such acts against any race or group of persons of another colour or ethnic origin . . . ." International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted Dec. 21, 1965, G.A.
Res. 2106 (XX), U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., art. 4, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969).
While the United States has signed and ratified the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Senate made the following reservation upon ratification: "the
Constitution and laws of the United States contain extensive protections of individual freedom of
speech, expression and association. Accordingly, the United States does not accept any obligation under
this Convention, in particular under article[] 4 . . . to restrict those rights . . . to the extent that they are

protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States." Status of Ratification, Reservations, and
Declarationsof the InternationalConvention on the EliminationofAll Forms ofRacial Discrimination,
UNITED

NATIONS

TREATY

COLLECTION

(July

26,

2013,

7:36

AM),

http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsgno-IV-2&chapter-4&lang-en.
7. See John C. Knechtle, When to Regulate Hate Speech, 110 PENN ST. L. REv. 539, 539
(2006). The article will only focus on hostile work and educational environments to the extent that
social media hate speech can be used to detract a customer base from a minority's business and how it
can be used to prosecute parents of students. It will not, therefore, address hostile work environment
claims or school-related claims that will usually require more evidence than only social media speech.
The fourth major type of hate speech, historical revisionism of events that affected religious or racial
groups, is not addressed, as it usually does not target specific individuals, and is therefore not apt for a
tort-based approach.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol82/iss3/8

2

Holschuh: #civilrightscybertorts: Utilizing Torts to Combat Hate Speech in

2014] UTILIZING TORTS To COMBAT HATE SPEECH INONLINE SOCIAL MEDIA 955
for social media hate speech and provides an analysis of the ability of
each claim to combat social media hate speech using the hate speech
tweets targeting Joel Ward as a case study.
It then offers
recommendations for legislation that would provide causes of action to
combat social media hate speech. Finally, Part V concludes by
discussing the law's potential to combat hate speech in social media.
II. BACKGROUND TO SOCIAL MEDIA AND INTERNET HATE SPEECH

A. Twitter and Facebook
In the past decade, the use of social media services has expanded
tremendously within American society, impacting nearly every
American's life and providing a new forum for interpersonal
communication. Facebook and Twitter's unique structures, though,
individualize, publicize, and facilitate hate speech to an extent that
impacts the victims of hate speech more than other communication
forums. 8 Present laws were not constructed to address social media,
which has provided a completely new forum for speech.9
Facebook is a social networking service founded in 2004 that has
expanded to over a billion monthly users, around twenty percent of
whom are in the United States or Canada.' 0 Facebook allows individual
users to create their own web page that includes their own personal
profile and a "wall." Users can post messages on other users' walls that
can be seen by third party users, subject to privacy settings, and users
can also send private messages.
Twitter is a real-time social networking service that allows
individuals to create a personal profile and send 140-character long
"tweets." 1 Tweets are then posted to the writer's profile, and users who
"follow" the original writer will see those tweets in their Twitterfeed.12
8. See Jacqueline D. Lipton, Combating Cyber-Victimization, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1103,
1105-06, 1112 (2011) ("Online abuses . . . disproportionately affect 'traditionally subordinated groups,'
which include . . . minorities.") ("Cyber-attackers can utilize the Internet to harass their victims on a
scale never before possible because of both the immediate effect of their conduct, and the speed and
ease of the global dissemination of online information.").
9. See Leslie Yalof Garfield, The Death of Slander, 35 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 17, 19 (2011)
("[T]weeting and blogging are now more regularly replacing the face to face communications that so
frequently occurred during the time of slander's origin.").
10. Company Info, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM, http://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/ (last visited
May 19, 2014).
11. About Twitter, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/about (last visited July 15, 2013).
12. Posting a Tweet, TWITTER, http://support.twitter.com/articles/15367-how-to-post-a-twitterupdate-or-tweet
(last visited May 19, 2014);
FAQs About Following, TWITTER,
http://support.twitter.com/groups/52-connect/topics/213-following/articles/14019-faqs-about-following
(last visited May 19, 2014).
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Although users can delete their own tweets, they cannot delete other
users' tweets.13 Tweets can also contain hashtags (#) followed by a
keyword or topic that will place the tweet in that hashtag category.14 By
clicking on a hashtag link, a user will see all messages containing that
hashtag, and popular subjects become "trending topics."' 5 Users can
also "mention" other users by typing "@username" in their text. 16
Although mentions do not appear on the mentioned-user's profile page,
users will see any mentions posted by a user they follow, and anyone
can search and view all tweets mentioning a certain user.'7 Thus, a
comment about an individual can be broadcast to thousands of people's
Twitterfeeds, and those users can then rebroadcast it if they wish. Both
Twitter and Facebook allow users to block other individuals, but the
practical implications of blocking are limited.' 8
B. The Uniquely Public Targeting Nature ofFacebookPosts and Twitter
Tweets
The individualization of the Internet and social media through
Facebook and Twitter has created a new forum for communication in
America. Social media websites are public, like newspapers, as well as
targeted and individualized, like letters. They also differ from
traditional Internet chat rooms in that individuals' families and friends
are more likely to be present on Twitter and Facebook. While social
media networks provide greater interpersonal connectivity, they also
provide electronic forums where users can individually and publicly
13. Posting a Tweet, supra note 12.
14. Using Hashtags on Twitter, TWITTER, http://support.twitter.com/articles/49309-usinghashtags-on-twitter (last visited May 19, 2014).
15. Id.
16. What Are @replies and Mentions?, TWITTER, http://support.twitter.com/groups/3 1-twitterbasics/topics/109-tweets-messages/articles/14023-what-are-replies-and-mentions (last visited May 19,
2014).
17. Id.
18. Blocked Twitter users cannot: (1) add the blocker's Twitter account to their list; (2) have
their mentions or @replies shown in the blocker's mention tab (although these Tweets can still appear in
a search); (3) follow the blocker; (4) see the blocker's profile picture on their profile page or in their
timeline; or (5) tag the blocker in a photo. Because Tweets may still appear in a search and because of
Twitter's reluctance to take down posts, Tweets remain available to the public indefinitely regardless of
the
harm they cause to
a user.
Blocking People on Twitter, TWITTER,
http://support.twitter.com/articles/117063-blocking-people-on-twitter (last visited May 19, 2014).
Blocking users on Facebook prevents the blocked user from viewing things the blocker shares on his or
her timeline or tagging the blocker in posts or photos. Similar to Twitter, though, a Facebook block
"may not prevent all communications or interactions, such as in apps or groups, and only affects your
Blocking People, FACEBOOK,
experience on Facebook, not elsewhere on the web."
http://www.facebook.com/help/290450221052800/ (last visited May 19, 2014). Thus, if a Facebook
group page is open to the public, blocked users may still post damaging remarks regarding blockers.
Additionally, blocked users may still post remarks regarding the blocker on their own Facebook walls.
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target other users. As the'Supreme Court has noted: "Through the use of
chat rooms, any person. . . can become a town crier with a voice that
resonates farther than it could from any soapbox. Through the use of
Web pages, mail exploders, and newsgroups, the same individual can
become a pamphleteer."' 9 Unlike traditional chat rooms and webpages,
however, new social media provides direct access to victims' families,
friends, employers, and clients.
C. The Public and Temporal Nature of the Social Media Forum
The geographic and temporal nature of the Internet enables messages
to be broadcast across the world and engraved in the cyber realm until
the user or the network voluntarily takes, or is compelled to take, the
messages offline. 20 Sending messages is free and extremely easy.
Facebook posts and Twitter tweets can be seen instantaneously by
individuals all over the world, and, perhaps worse, by all members of an
individual's local community. The size of the audience means the
message reaches more people, which increases the chance of violent
reactions21 in addition to providing a larger audience to embarrass the
victim. Likewise, by "friending" or following users, Facebook and
Twitter also allow community building and organizing, which in turn
facilitates group and localized violence. 22 Moreover, the "one-to-many"
effect of social media websites and the lack of face-to-face contact
causes speakers to be less restrained in their speech, while the
moderating and rationalizing effect of the crowd on the speaker and
listener is also absent.2 3
Facebook and Twitter have different policies for addressing and
removing hate speech. Facebook is proactive in self-censoring antiSemitic s eech and will remove posts upon user and government
requests.2 Twitter, on the other hand, does not address user complaints
regarding anti-Semitic hate speech, and is often uncooperative with
governments.25
Hate speech posts and tweets therefore remain
accessible to a global community until the user or the social media
website's company decides to remove them. This means that hate
19. Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997).
20. See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Incendiary Speech and Social Media, 44 TEX. TECH L. REv. 147,
148-50 (2011) (discussing the geographical contextual dislocation and spatial/temporal dimensions of
social media, and the impact on users).
21. Id at 149.
22. Id
23. Id. at 149-50.
24. Nathan Guttman, When Hate Speech Hits Social Media, THE JEWISH DAILY FORWARD (June
4, 2012), http://forward.com/articles/157134/when-hate-speech-hits-social-media/?p=all.
2 5. Id
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speech continues to affect victims long after they "turn off' the
computer or quit the social networking site. 26
D. The DangersofInternet Hate Speech
The purposes and types of hate speech in social media also differ
from user to user. Users have posted hate speech to express political
ideas, as when Twitter exploded with hate speech following some of
President Obama's public addresses. 27 Hate speech can be used to
target, insult, intimidate, or harass individuals, like the tweets attacking
Joel Ward.28 Hate speech on social media websites has been used to
threaten groups or individuals and to intimidate them from engaging in
certain activities,29 such as the Facebook post threatening the Hispanic
student,30 as well as to incite hatred and even mass violence. 3'
Hate speech has a profoundly negative effect on victims and "can
cause mental, emotional, or even physical harm to [its] target, especially
if delivered in front of others or by a person in a position of authority." 32
Victims suffer immediate mental and emotional distress, and hate
speech's ability to stir up and intensify previous stigmatization can
cause long-term psychological harm. 33 Physical symptoms include "fear
in the gut, rapid pulse rate and difficulty in breathing, nightmares, posttraumatic stress disorder, hypertension, psychosis, and suicide." 3 4 Hate
speech can cause victims to reject their identities and disassociate with
other members of the victim-group.35 Attacks can force victims to stop
26. Lipton, supranote 8, at 1113.
27. 'Take that N*gger Off TV': Racist Tweets Unleashed During President Obama s Sandy
Hook
Vigil
Speech,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Dec.
17,
2012,
2:47
PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/17/take-that-nigger-off-tv-racist-tweetsobama n_2317185.html.
28. robbercat, supra note 1; Citron, supra note 4, at 78-79.
29. Although not race-related, Hal Turner, a blogger and radio talk show host, was convicted of
threatening to assault or murder three federal judges when he posted on his blog that they "deserved to
be killed" for upholding a hand-gun ban and posted their photographs, phone numbers, work addresses,
and room numbers. Lidsky, supra note 20, at 157 (internal quotation marks omitted).
30. See supra text accompanying note 5.
31. After the pastor Terry Jones issued a tweet declaring September 11, 2010, "Int[emational]
Burn a Koran Day," violent reactions in Afghanistan resulted in at least thirty deaths. Lidsky, supra
note 20, at 150.
32. Delgado, supra note 6, at 143 (footnotes omitted).
33. Id. at 146.
34. Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87
MICH. L. REv. 2320, 2336 (1989). See also Kwiatkowski v. Merrill Lynch, No. L-1031-04, 2008 WL
3875417, at *5-6 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 13, 2008) (noting that a gay plaintiff experienced
"panic attacks, sleeplessness, nightmares, depression, upset stomach, loss of appetite, shortness of
breath, chest pain, weakness, and emotional instability" and was diagnosed with posttraumatic stress
disorder after being called a "stupid fag").
35. Matsuda, supranote 34, at 2337.
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using their online accounts, affecting both their ability to communicate 36
and their First Amendment right to freedom of speech and association.
The large scale, immediate, and constant effects of social media
communication exacerbate these harmful effects.
The ability of social media communication to arouse anger and action
against targets means that hate speech spread on Facebook and Twitter
has a particularly acute ability to affect victims' employment. Hate
speech targeting an individual or business's Facebook or Twitter
account can lead to the user abandoning the use of social network sites,
thereby decreasing access to a potential customer base. 38 It can suggest
incompetence or conflict that could deter potential employers or
customers, which can impact reputations permanently. 39 In short, social
media hate speech can have seriously negative physical, emotional, and
economic effects on victims.
III. CYBER-TORT HURDLES

A. Identity of Defendant

With the use of social media websites spreading faster and users
being more willing to share intimate knowledge, Facebook and Twitter
are vast depositories of personal information. This means litigation
connected with social media websites involves serious privacy issues.
Facebook and Twitter users can mask their identities using anonymous
or pseudonymous profiles, and Facebook and Twitter have protocols to
protect against the disclosure of users' identities. 40 Therefore,
discovering the identity of anonymous users may pose the first hurdle in
hate speech cyber litigation.
Unmasking perpetrators is not impossible, though, and at least two
courts have ordered service providers to release the identities of users
asserting defamatory statements about another user, while several others
have considered the issue. 4 1 Anonymity, therefore, does not appear to
36. Citron, supra note 4, at 62.
37. Lipton, supra note 8, at 1112.
38. Citron, supra note 4, at 64, 80.
39. Id. at 62, 80.
40. Facebook will release private information in response to legal requests when it has a "good
faith belief' that it is required to do so by law. Data Use Policy, Some Things You Need to Know,
FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/other (last visited May 9, 2014); Twitter will
release private information when in believes it is "reasonably necessary" to comply with the law or legal
request. Twitter Privacy Policy, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/privacy (last visited May 9, 2014).
41. See Doe I v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249, 257 (D. Conn. 2008) (When "the plaintiff has
shown sufficient evidence supporting a prima facie case for libel," the plaintiffs interest in pursuing
discovery "outweighs the defendant's First Amendment right to speak anonymously."); Cohen v.
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be an insurmountable wall against discovery. Nevertheless, fake or
pseudonymous accounts may still prevent liability when the user has
provided false information to the social media website or service
provider.
B. Jurisdiction
Asserting jurisdiction over defendants may also be problematic. In
Lyons v. Rienzi & Sons, Inc., the Eastern District of New York found
that an Italian company's Facebook page alone does not constitute
purposeful availment to satisfy New York's long-arm statute.42 Thus, a
Facebook profile does not mean the defendant has availed himself to
every jurisdiction in the U.S. Whether posting social media messages
about a user in another state would constitute personal availment is
another question that courts have not answered.
Trials involving the Internet will often involve or be held in areas
other than where plaintiffs live. The costs of discovery, including
attempts to unmask anonymous defendants, could possibly make cases
too costly to pursue, especially in distant jurisdictions.4 3 Jurisdictional
issues become even more difficult when one considers the limited
number of judicial districts in which a social media hate speech cause of
action is likely to succeed, which makes forum shopping crucial.4
C. Discovery
Once the identity of the defendant is revealed, additional discovery
should not be difficult. In Zimmerman v. Weis Markets, Inc., a
Pennsylvania trial court ordered the plaintiff to provide the defendant
with the plaintiffs password, username, and login names for all
Facebook and MySpace accounts, indicating that privacy concerns do
not protect information found on a social media website.45 Access to
defendants' accounts can, in turn, lead to identification of other victims.

Google, Inc., 887 N.Y.S.2d 424 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009) (ISP ordered to disclose identity of blogger who
made defamatory statements against plaintiff); see also Mallory Allen, Ninth Circuit Unmasks
Anonymous Internet Users and Lowers the Barfor Disclosureof Online Speakers, 7 WASH J.L. TECH. &
ARTS 75 (2011).
42. Lyons v. Rienzi & Sons, Inc., 856 F. Supp. 2d 501, 509 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).
43. Lipton, supra note 8, at 1131.
44. See infra Part IV.A-C.
45. Zimmerman v. Weis Mkts., Inc., No. CV-09-1535, 2011 WL 2065410 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl.
Northumberland Cnty. May 19, 2011). See also Patterson v. Turner Const. Co., 931 N.Y.S.2d 311
(N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (plaintiffs relevant Facebook information was subject to discovery despite the
use of privacy settings).
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D. Liability of Twitter andFacebook

Suing Twitter or Facebook for refusing to remove hate speech is
precluded by § 230(c)(1) of the Communications Decency Act, which
prevents treating any "provider or user of an interactive computer
service . .. as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by

another information content provider."46 Thus, despite Twitter's lack of
cooperation in removing anti-Semitic remarks from its service, the
company cannot be held liable for any damage inflicted by those
comments. When the actual speaker remains anonymous or lacks any
monetary assets, a suit against a social media website does not provide
an alternative and there may be no remedy available for the victim. 47
E. Remedies and Limitations on Damages

Various remedies are available for victims of social media hate
speech. Economic damages should be available to compensate victims
for their physical and mental anguish.4 8 Although these harms are often
difficult to value,4 9 expert testimony can be used to establish the mental
and physical harm that hate speech can cause victims, while doctor and
psychiatrist bills can also be used to substantiate damages. Punitive
damages may often be available.5 0 Economic damages caused to a
plaintiffs business might be substantial, but difficult to prove without
extremely detailed records.

Attorney fees are available under some

"Intimidation Based on Bigotry or Bias" statutes.5 1 Equitable relief such
as injunctions should also be sought to stop defendants from
communicating about the victim on social media accounts.
Statutes may place limitations on damages. For example, Ohio
Revised Code § 2307.70(B)(1), Ohio's "Intimidation Based on Bigotry
or Bias" statute, caps parental liability at $15,000, costs, and attorneys'
fees. States may also have other statutes that limit the amount of
damages recoverable in certain tort actions.
There may be further constitutional limitations on recovery. In
46. 47 U.S.C. §230(c)(1) (2012).
47. Lipton, supranote 8, at 1133.
48. See supra Part II.D (providing examples of physical and mental harm).
49. Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Cybertorts and Legal Lag: An EmpiricalAnalysis,
13 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 77, 102 (2003).
50. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1979) ("Punitive damages may be
awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of the defendant's evil motive or his reckless
indifference to the rights of others.").
51. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.70 (West 2013); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52571c(b) (West 2013). For more information on "Intimidation Based on Bigotry or Bias" statutes, see
infra Part IV.C.1.
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Snyder v. Phelps, the Supreme Court found that the First Amendment's
protection of speech regarding matters of public concern precluded the
Westboro Baptist Church from being found liable for intentional
infliction of emotional distress or intrusion upon seclusion when it
picketed a soldier's funeral.52 The church members held offensive
signs, including one labeled "God Hates Fags," and the Church posted
an online account addressing the Snyder family directly.5 3 Although not
addressing social media, Snyder may present an obstacle to finding
liability against social media users who intertwine political rants with
hate speech, especially if the user does not direct the comment at
another user.
F. Analysis of the PotentiallyFruitful Tort Realm of Twitter and
Facebook
Facebook and Twitter, recording billions of interactions between
millions of citizens a day, have presented a brand new area of tort law.
Hate speech, furthermore, has permeated social media. Serious and
repeated incidents of hate speech directed at individuals will
undoubtedly occur, and can cause serious economic, psychological, and
physical harm. The ability of individuals to communicate to thousands
of individuals at once means that the psychological harm caused by
insults is severe, the economic harm caused by lost clients and
employers is substantial, and the possibility of physical harm caused by
mob violence is real.
Cyber torts provide both obstacles and opportunities for hate speech
suits. Anonymity can usually be overcome through court orders, but can
nevertheless present an insurmountable obstacle in some cases.
Obtaining personal jurisdiction over the defendant could be challenging,
and pursuing cases in inconvenient forums will be expensive. Proving
damages may be difficult, but once established the damages could be
high monetary sums. And while there are damage limitations in some
situations, in most cases they will not completely prevent access to
remedies. Although there are substantial obstacles, they will usually not
make recovery in hate speech claims impossible.
Furthermore, e-discovery has unique benefits. If the case advances
past the summary judgment stage, attorneys should utilize discovery to
uncover potential clients whom the defendant has targeted, which could
lead to new plaintiffs with supplemental causes of action against the
same defendant. As Zimmerman demonstrates, courts are willing to

52. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219-21 (2011).
53. Id. at 1225-26 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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grant access to the other party's Facebook and Twitter accounts for
discovery purposes, and the permanency of cyber communications
means that allegations that the plaintiff is making false claims will be
easy to rebut. Thus, the difficulties of cyber litigation should not
prevent attorneys from pressing claims against perpetrators of hate
speech in social media and may in fact provide promising opportunities
to uncover evidence and new clients.
G. Recommendation to FacilitateSocial Media Hate Speech Victims'
Access to Civil Remedies by Amending the Communications Decency
Act
Congress should amend the Communications Decency Act to permit
server liability for refusing to remove hate speech.5 4 Any abrogation to
server liability, though, should be carefully restricted to hate speech in
order to prevent censorship of legitimate free speech. Social media sites
such as Twitter will be much more willing to take down offensive
messages if it means they could be held liable for monetary damages.
IV. CYBER-TORTS AVAILABLE TO COMBAT HATE SPEECH

A. IntentionalInfliction ofEmotionalDistress
1. Discussion on Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims
Involving Hate Speech
Intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) offers a promising
avenue for combating social media hate speech by providing a cause of
action against "extreme and outrageous conduct [that] intentionally or
recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another .... s The cause
of action may stand on its own56 and a post or tweet that is "extreme and
outrageous" and "intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional
Given the
distress to another" would create liability for its author.
individualized nature of Facebook wall posts and Twitter mentions,
social media hate speech is by definition a more personalized, and
therefore intentional, infliction of distress.
The issue remains, though, whether the conduct is sufficiently
outrageous. The Restatement (Second) of Torts notes that IED "does
54. See supra Part III.D.
55.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 46(1)

(1965).

56. Id. § 46 cmt. b.
57. Id. § 46(1).
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not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty
oppressions, or other trivialities" so that there is "a safety
valve. . . through which irascible tempers may blow off relatively
harmless steam." 58 As such, IIED only extends to conduct that is
"utterly intolerable in a civilized community." 59 However, Comment (0
states, "[tihe extreme and outrageous character of the conduct may arise
from the actor's knowledge that the other is peculiarly susceptible to
emotional distress, by reason of some physical or mental condition or
peculiarity."60
IIED will generally cover severe threats 6 1 and has been successfully
used in the past to combat online threats.6 2 Thus, if a Facebook or
Twitter post alleges serious and disturbing threats to a minority, an IIED
claim will usually succeed.
The question is whether racial epithets and less-than-severe threats
are merely harmless insults, or whether they target individuals who are
peculiarly vulnerable due to some physical attribute. The answer will
depend on the tribunal's perception of the hate speech-whether it is
merely name-calling, or whether it invokes a history of hate that
specifically targets and impacts a minority and should not be tolerated in
civilized communities. Regrettably, most courts have found that racial
slurs are "mere insults" and do not qualify as outrageous enough to
sustain an intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action.6 3
For example, in Bradshaw v. Swagerty, a Kansas court of appeals found
that "the trial court was fully justified in regarding the [racial] epithets
complained of here as 'mere insults' of the kind which must be tolerated
in our roughedged society." 64 Numerous federal courts have found that
verbal racial epithets in employment or public situations do not amount
to intentional infliction of emotional distress, 65 which reflect the many
58. Id. § 46 cmt. d.
59. Id.
60. Id. § 46 cmt. f.
61. See, e.g., State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 240 P.2d 282, 284-86 (Cal. 1952).
62. Citron, supra note 4, at 88.
63. See, e.g., Adams v. Vertex, Inc., No. 04-01026 (HHK), 2007 WL 1020788, at *5 (D.D.C.
Mar. 29,2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
64. Bradshaw v. Swagerty, 563 P.2d 511, 514 (Kan. Ct. App. 1977).
65. See, e.g., Bongam v. Action Toyota, Inc., 14 Fed. App'x 275, 283 (4th Cir. 2001)
("Marcatili's single alleged utterance of the slur, standing alone, is not the sort of 'major
outrage ... essential to the tort' of IIED."); Walker v. Thompson, 214 F.3d 615, 628 (5th Cir. 2000) ("In
the case at bar, although the appellee's racial harassment of the appellants may have been illegal . .. it
does not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct under Texas law."); Ugalde v. W.A.
McKenzie Asphalt Co., 990 F.2d 239, 243 (5th Cir. 1993) (supervisor calling employee "wetback" and
"Mexican" did not give rise to an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim); Watkins v. City of
Southfield, 221 F.3d 883, 890 (6th Cir. 2000) ("The alleged use of a racial epithet gives us some pause,
but we are satisfied that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of
defendants on this claim."); Harris v. Sutton Motor Sales & RV Consignments Corp., 406 Fed. App'x
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and various state courts that have come to similar conclusions.6 6
Nevertheless, several state courts have held that in an employment
context, due to the special relationship between the employer and the
employee, racial epithets do constitute intentional infliction of emotional
distress. The Supreme Courts of Washington, 67 New Jersey, 68 and
California 69 have held that racial epithets in the workplace can constitute
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Supreme Court of
California noted the evolving connotations of racial biases, stating,
"[a]lthough the slang epithet 'nigger' may once have been in common
usage ... [it] has become particularly abusive and insulting in light of
recent developments in the civil rights' movement ... ."70 The Supreme
Court of Washington similarly concluded: "[a]s we as a nation of
immigrants become more aware of the need for pride in our diverse
181, 183 (9th Cir. 2010) ("Harris' claims fail because, although unquestionably offensive, the [racially
charged] comments [complained ofJ do not amount to the required 'extraordinary transgression of the
bounds of socially tolerable conduct."'); Bouie v. Autozone, Inc., 959 F.2d 875, 877 (10th Cir. 1992)
("On this appeal we must hold that the evidence provided no basis for a cause of action for outrageous
conduct [in] New Mexico . .. [because] the racial slurs relied on were not made to the plaintiff by the
defendants, nor in his presence, nor within his hearing."); Vance v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 983 F.2d
1573, 1574 n.2, 1575 n.7 (llth Cir. 1993) (finding that hanging a noose in the plaintiffs workspace did
not constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress).
66. See, e.g., Graham v. Guilderland Cent. Sch. Dist., 681 N.Y.S.2d 831, 831 (N.Y. App. Div.
1998) ("[The d]efendant's utterances[,] made during a frank classroom discussion of prejudice[] in an
attempt to illustrate the hurtful nature of such comments, [are] not enough to trigger [an IIED] claim.");
Lay v. Roux Labs, Inc., 379 So.2d 451, 452 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (defendant's use of racial
epithets, including "nigger," against the plaintiff in an argument over a parking space does not reach the
necessary level of outrageousness); Paige v. Youngstown Bd. of Educ., No. 93 C.A. 212, 1994 WL
718839, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 23, 1994) ("We do not dispute that racial slurs should be considered
as part of Felton's overall conduct toward Paige. However, these comments alone do not rise to the
level of conduct which went 'beyond all possible bounds of decency' or which was 'utterly intolerable
in a civilized community.' As a matter of practicality, as part of living in our society, we must tolerate a
certain amount of offensive expression.").
67. Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 565 P.2d 1173, 1177 (Wash. 1977) ("[A]ppellant's
claim that he was subjected to intentional or reckless conduct on the part of respondent which was
beyond all reasonable bounds of decency and caused him severe emotional distress by reason of acts of
intimidation, demotions, humiliation in public and exposure to scorn and ridicule, when respondent's
agents knew or should have known that by reason of his Mexican nationality and background he was
particularly susceptible to emotional distress as a result of respondent's conduct, is within the
parameters of the tort of outrage . . . .").
68. Taylor v. Metzger, 706 A.2d 685, 696 (N.J. 1998) ("In light of the potency of racial slurs and
defendant's authority as sheriff, a jury could reasonably determine that defendant's conduct was extreme
and outrageous.").
69. Alcom v. Anbro Eng'g, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 499 (Cal. 1970) (footnote omitted) ("Although it
may be that mere insulting language, without more, ordinarily would not constitute extreme outrage, the
aggravated circumstances alleged by plaintiff seem sufficient to uphold his complaint as against
defendants' general demurrer."); Agarwal v. Johnson, 25 Cal. 3d 932, 947 (Cal. 1979) ("Agarwal here
presented substantial evidence that French's use of the racial epithet was outrageous and that French
acted knowingly and unreasonably with the intention to inflict mental distress and abused his position to
humiliate Agarwal and also to recommend Agarwal's termination for reasons that were not true.").
70. Alcon, 2 Cal. 3d at 498 n.4.
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backgrounds, racial epithets which were once part of common usage
may not now be looked upon as 'mere insulting language.'" 7 1
At least one state court has held that racial epithets alone and in a
nonemployment situation can constitute intentional infliction of
emotional distress, albeit in an unreported case. Jones v. Hirschberger
involved a neighbor calling his African-American neighbor "nigger,"
"monkey," and "orangutan." 72 The Second District Court of Appeals for
California found that, "[w]hile important, the distinction between the
employment context and this case is not dispositive," and held that the
cumulative impact of multiple racial epithets over a one year period
could be considered outrageous by a trier of fact.7 3 Thus, at least in
California, a plaintiff may have an intentional infliction of emotional
distress cause of action against another private individual for using
racial epithets in a nonemployment context, such as a social media
situation.
Religious harassment has not been found to be "outrageous" enough
to satisfy an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. In
Vaughn v. Ag Processing,Inc., the Supreme Court of Iowa found that a
manager who called an employee "a 'goddamn stupid fuckin' Catholic"'
and a different employee as "'[a]nother dumb Catholic,"' along with
other comments denigrating Catholicism, did not constitute an
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.74 The Vaughn court
did not interpret religious harassment to constitute intentional infliction
of emotional distress, but the case did not involve the use of a religious
hate-epithet.
Courts are split as to whether homophobic slurs constitute a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. In Moye v. Gary, the
Southern District of New York found that, in a private conversation, a
supervisor calling a heterosexual employee a "fag" and "poor woman"
in front of her daughter did not "go beyond all possible bounds of
decency [as] to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a
civilized community."7 In Kwlatkowski v. Merrill Lynch, however, the
Superior Court of New Jersey found that a supervisor muttering "stupid
fag" to a gay employee under her breath may constitute IED because
the plaintiffs psychiatrist had testified to the severe stress it had

71. Contreras, 565 P.2dat 1177.
72. Jones v. Hirschberger, No. B135112, 2002 WL 853858, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. May 6, 2002)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
73. Id. at *9.

74. Vaughn v. Ag Processing, Inc., 459 N.W.2d 627, 631, 636 (Iowa 1990).
75. Moye v. Gary, 595 F. Supp. 738, 739-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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caused.76 Whether or not a homophobic epithet can constitute
intentional infliction of emotional distress may therefore depend on the
victim's sexual orientation and the ability of the plaintiff to demonstrate
emotional injury.
2. Analysis of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims'
Ability to Combat Social Media Hate Speech
Pursuing an IIED claim for targeted hate speech in social media is
possible but will be very difficult without a serious, direct threat. It will
also depend on the circumstances of the case and the jurisdiction of the
court. While single tweets or messages are actionable, series of
exchanges will provide a better showing of intent and the distress
caused, as the court in Jones noted the multiple interactions between the
neighbors over a year.77
The unique distress caused by the message may depend upon who
sent the message, tags within the message, and the forum within
Facebook or Twitter, such as whether a Facebook post was made on the
plaintiffs wall, the defendant's wall, or within a special group page.
Tagging a user means that not only will the victim see the message, but
also that the victim's family and friends are much more likely to see the
message as well, creating an increased potential for mental anguish.
Posting hate speech in certain group pages, hate speech targeting a
plaintiffs business's account, and social media hate speech by
employers could all affect employment situations, and as Contreras,
Alcorn, Agarwal, and Taylor highlight, if the post occurred in an
employment context, an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim
would be much more likely to state a cause of action. Thus, the manner
the message was sent would affect the audience the message reaches,
which in turn would have different effects on the damage caused to the
victim and the outrageousness of the conduct.
Tweets or Facebook posts consisting of serious threats probably will
constitute a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, and a
single, serious threat may be enough evidence to provide summary
judgment for the plaintiff. Less serious threats, however, probably will
not, considering that one court has previously found that hanging a
noose in a plaintiffs work place was insufficient to state a claim. The
tone of the threat and whether the wording is likely to incite readers to
violence will determine whether the message is outrageous.
76.
App. Div.
77.
78.

Kwiatkowski v. Merrill Lynch, No. L-1031-04, 2008 WL 3875417, at *4, 18 (N.J. Sup. Ct.
Aug. 13, 2008).
Jones, 2002 WL 853858, at *9.
See Vance v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 983 F.2d 1573, 1574 n.2, 1575 n.7 (1lth Cir. 1993).
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Messages containing only racial or religious hate speech, without
serious threats, are only likely to succeed in California or a minority of
other jurisdictions where courts have found that racial epithets alone can
constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress. "Fag," however,
may be sufficiently outrageous if it is made against a homosexual, as
Kwlatkowski portrays. Barring the presence of a serious threat,
therefore, an IED claim for hate speech in social media is unlikely to
have much case support. Social media, however, is a new forum, and
notwithstanding the case law, plaintiffs should press the boundaries of
what hate speech courts will find outrageous.
The hate speech tweeted by brendmaitland, RealSteezyDubz, and
Grizzlymarshall would probably not constitute claims for intentional
infliction of emotional distress in most jurisdictions outside of
California, but they nevertheless present novel considerations for a
tribunal. Both brendmaitland and RealSteezyDubz make "mere" threats,
and the compounded effect of hundreds of these "mere" threats over
Twitter may constitute an immediacy and distinctness that suffices to
cause the same distress as one "serious" threat made in person.
Brendmaitland added the hashtag "#JoelWard" to his post, meaning that
any search for Joel Ward on Twitter can bring up that tweet, which
could affect the immediacy of the threat and the distress caused. The
employment context surrounding the tweets could also affect the level of
distress caused by the tweet if Joel Ward experienced this hate speech
every time he played an NHL game, as well as damages if Ward could
show that the distress caused by the tweets affected his ability to play
hockey.
A claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against
Grizzlymarshall is unlikely to be successful since it is a single, isolated
racial epithet, does not contain a threat, and does not mention Joel Ward.
Claims against brendmaitland and RealSteezyDubz for intentional
infliction of emotional distress are also unlikely, but due to their unique
context may constitute a claim in more progressive jurisdictions.
IED claims against social media hate speakers should emphasize the
public and indefinite nature of tweets and Facebook posts, how they
target specific individuals, and their expanded audience. Plaintiffs
should also analyze and expound the social media context of the
comments at issue, including the audience the message could reach, as
well as the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant. Any
threats or consequences to the victim's employment should be noted, as
the negative effects of both are exacerbated by social media. Expert
evidence presented by doctors, psychiatrists, and sociologists will be
helpful in portraying how damaging hate speech can be, and can also
establish damages.
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Because of the reluctance of courts to find that racial epithets are
outrageous, and the action's inapplicability to "mere threats," IIED
plaintiffs outside of California face an uphill battle when asserting
intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. Nevertheless,
society's definition of outrageous conduct is constantly in flux. The
Restatement (Second) of Torts specifically notes that the law of
intentional infliction of emotional distress "is still in a stage of
development" and that it "intended to leave fully open the possibility of
further development of the law ... ."79 As the Washington Supreme
Court stated in Contreras: "racial epithets which were once part of
common usage may not now be looked upon as 'mere insulting
language.' Changing sensitivity in society alters the acceptability of
former terms."80 Plaintiffs should bring intentional infliction of
emotional distress claims for social media hate speech in order to allow
judges and juries the opportunity to decide whether hate speech in this
new, unique forum is acceptable in modem society.
B. Defamation and Disparagement

1. Discussion on Defamation Claims Involving Hate Speech
Defamation provides a cause of action when a defendant's false
statements harm the plaintiffs reputation.8 1 There are two forms of
action for defamation: libel and slander. 82 Libel applies to written or
printed words, while slander applies to spoken words.83 The difference
is not just nominal, as libel does not require special damages to be
actionable, while slander usually does. 84 Generally, however, courts
have ruled that Internet postings injuring an individual's reputation are
libel, and therefore do not require proof of special damages.
Courts have come to mixed conclusions regarding whether racial
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §46 cmt. c (1965).
80. Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 565 P.2d 1173, 1177 (Wash. 1977).
81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 558-559 (1977).
82. PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS 886 (Victor E. Schwartz et al. eds., 12th ed. 2010)
[hereinafter PROSSER].
83. Id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568 (1977). The Restatement (Second) of
Torts established a cause of action when an individual "publishes matter defamatory of another in such a
manner as to make the publication a libel . . . ." Id. § 569.
84. PROSSER, supranote 82, at 886.
85. Garfield, supra note 9, at 29; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568(3) (1977)
("The area of dissemination, the deliberate and premeditated character of its publication and the
persistence of the defamation are factors to be considered in determining whether a publication is a libel
rather than a slander."). Slander does not require proof of special damages if the publication imputes:
(1) a criminal offense; (2) a loathsome disease; (3) a matter incompatible with one's business; or (4)
serious sexual misconduct. Id. § 570(a)-(d).
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epithets qualify as defamation. The primary issue is whether a racial
epithet is an identifier, and therefore per se true, or whether it has an
underlying connotation worse than merely identifying race and is
therefore per se false. A statement that is true is a defense to
defamation, meaning the difference is critical to whether a hate-epithet
would qualify as defamation.
Some courts have found that racial epithets are merely a form of
identification, and are therefore true, or are insults not amounting to
defamation. For example, the Michigan Court of Appeals has held that
the term "nigger" has a "natural and ordinary import . .. as a slang term

referring to members of the Negro race, a meaning that is not
defamatory." 86 Viewing racial epithets as insults, on the other hand, the
Northern District of Ohio found that racially based epithets were "mere
verbal abuse of the sort that is not actionable as defamation." 87 These
courts have refused to look at the underlying history and harm of racial
epithets in analyzing ewhether they are actionable as defamation.
While most courts have found that racial epithets are not defamatory,
an emerging line of cases has held to the contrary. For example, in
Diversified Communications Services, Inc. v. Landmark American
Insurance Co., the Central District of California found that "[a]s the
substance of a racial epithet is never true (i.e., that one's race necessarily
dictates her abilities and/or status in society), it seems that racial epithets
can always be proven false."88 Citing Richard Delgado, the court noted:
"[R]acial epithets are not simply a means of identification. No, because
they 'conjure up the entire history of racial discrimination in this
country,' racial epithets are much more than that." 89
Courts have also come to mixed conclusions regarding whether
homophobic slurs constitute defamation. The Southern District of South
Carolina found that "fag" and "faggot" do not constitute defamation.90
Other courts have found homophobic slurs to be defamation, but with
less than progressive reasoning. Noting that imputing homosexuality
used to be a crime, and therefore per se defamation under Texas law, the
Northern District of Texas held in Robinson v. Radio One, Inc. that the
86. Ledsinger v. Burmeister, 318 N.W.2d 558, 563 (1982). The court found, however, that the
plaintiffs stated a claim for IED. Id. at 562.
87. Garraway v. Diversified Material Handling, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 1026, 1034 (N.D. Ohio 1997).
88. Diversified Commc'ns Servs., Inc. v. Landmark Am. Ins. Co., No. CV 08-7703 PSG (Ssx),
2009 WL 772952, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2009).
89. Id. at *5 (citation omitted). See also Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Starplex
Corp., 188 P.3d 332, 347 (Or. Ct. App. 2008) (finding that racial epithets were sufficient to show
defamation); N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Dabagia, 721 N.E.2d 294, 307 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (Robb, J.,
concurring) (finding that "camel jockey" is defamatory).
90. Dewese v. Sci. Applications Int'l. Corp., No. 2:11-3024-DCN-BHH, 2012 WL 1902264, at
*1-2 (D.S.C. May 2, 2012).
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"imputation of homosexuality might as a matter of fact expose a person
to public hatred, contempt or ridicule" and could therefore constitute
defamation. 91 As the plaintiff was referred to as the "gay security
guard" on a radio program, 92 this ruling appears to find the homophobic
slur defamatory not because of its innate falsehood and ability to conjure
up a history of discrimination, but rather because it could label a straight
person as homosexual, which is viewed extremely negatively by some
parts of our society.
2. Discussion on Disparagement Claims
Similar to defamation, racial epithets used to affect a plaintiffs

business may constitute the claim of disparagement. A claim for
disparagement is recoverable when the defendant makes a false and
injurious statement discrediting and detracting from the plaintiffs
character, property, product, or business that causes a third party to take
an action resulting in a pecuniary loss to the plaintiff. 93 Hate speech can
instill fear in third parties not to purchase goods from the defendant, as
well as cast the defendant in a negative light, thereby deterring third
parties from commercially interacting with the defendant. 94 Thus, if a
defendant posts a racial epithet on a plaintiffs business's Facebook
page, or tweets them at a plaintiffs business's Twitter account, the
defendant could be held liable for disparagement. Damages may be
difficult to prove, but could be shown with records of lowered sales of
products or services.
3. Analysis of Defamation and Disparagement Claims' Ability to
Combat Social Media Hate Speech
Defamation and disparagement appear to be the most viable causes of
action to combat hate speech in social media. Courts are not reluctant to
find social media messages defamatory. 95 Moreover, the fact that
defamatory postings are often considered libel precludes the need to
prove special damages. Defamation and disparagement, therefore, are

potentially powerful tools to combat hate speech in social media.
Hate speech posts or tweets that contain homophobic slurs could
91. Robinson v. Radio One, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 2d 425, 428 (N.D. Tex. 2010).
92. Id. at 426.
93. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 239 (4th Pocket ed. 2011).

94. See Starplex, 188 P.3d at 348 (although the plaintiff raised the claim of disparagement in the
context of an individual shouting racial epithets in a busy airport in order to detract from business, the
court declined to comment on the issue because it had already found these actions accounted for special
damages to constitute a slander cause of action).
95. See Doe I v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249, 257 (D. Conn. 2008).
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provide liability for defamation. Robinson v. Radio One, Inc. portrays
that courts have found that homophobic slurs impute the trait of
homosexuality, which affects a victim's character in the eyes of society.
Although this line of reasoning should be abandoned in favor of a view
that treats homophobic slurs like the Diversified Communications
Services, Inc. analysis of racial slurs (i.e., that they impute other
unwanted characteristics besides homosexuality and are therefore per se
false), it is at least one possible avenue to pursue civil claims.
Racial epithets are increasingly likely to constitute defamation. As
Diversified Communications Services, Inc. makes clear, courts are
becoming more open minded to the idea that racial epithets are
objectionably false and actionable as defamation. In these jurisdictions,
with evidence readily available from Facebook or Twitter, plaintiffs
should have very strong cases against hate speech perpetrators.
Brendmaitland, RealSteezyDubz, and Grizzlymarshall all use the
word "nigger" to describe Ward in their tweets, therefore claims against
all three for defamation could very well succeed in some jurisdictions.
Furthermore, because they were about Ward's employment
performance, they may also constitute a claim for disparagement. The
objectively defamatory nature of hate epithets and the public
permanency of social media mean that defamation and disparagement
are very good causes of action to fight hate speech on Facebook and

Twitter.
C. "IntimidationBased on Bigotry or Bias" Statutes
1. Discussion on "Intimidation Based on Bigotry or Bias" Statutes
States have begun to enact statutes permitting private causes of action
based on crimes motivated by bigotry. For example, Ohio Revised
Code § 2307.70(A) provides a private cause of action for victims who
suffer injury to person or property as a result of ethnic intimidation,
which includes perpetrating criminal menacing and criminal mischief by
reason of the race, color, religion, or national origin of another person or
group of persons. 96 State statutes such as these that target actions, not
speech, have been upheld as constitutional and should be applicable to
96. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2927.12 (West 2013). Criminal menacing includes causing
"another to believe that the offender will cause physical harm to the person or property of the other
person, the other person's unborn, or a member of the other person's family." Id. § 2903.22(A).
Criminal mischief entails defacing, destroying, or otherwise improperly tampering with another's
property. Id. § 2909.07. See also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-571(c) (providing a cause of action for
damages resulting from intimidation based on bigotry or bias and stating that the court shall award treble
damages and may, at its discretion, provide equitable relief and attorney's fees).
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social media hate speech.97 Furthermore, O.R.C. § 2307.70(B)(1)
provides a cause of action against the parents of a minor who causes the
plaintiff to suffer injury to person or property as a result of ethnic
intimidation.9 8 The parental liability statute caps damages at $15,000 in
addition to court costs, expenses, and attorney's fees. 99 Thus, plaintiffs
can probably recover against minors in addition to adults for racially
motivated threats to their person or property, and may be able to recover
for other hate speech posted on their social media profiles by arguing the
perpetrator defaced their property.
2. Analysis of "Intimidation Based on Bigotry or Bias" Claims' Ability
to Combat Social Media Hate Speech
"Intimidation Based on Bigotry or Bias" statutes provide a possible
avenue to recover damages for hate speech in social media. Since hate
speech threats will often be considered "mere threats," but can
nevertheless make the victim believe they or a loved one is at risk of
physical violence, bigotry statutes that include criminal menacing cover
a broader range of hate speech threats not apt for IED claims.
Additionally, if plaintiffs can establish that their social media accounts
are their personal property, and that posting hate speech on their
Facebook profile or in Twitter mentions "defaces" that property, then
bigotry statutes that cover criminal mischief could also provide a cause
of action for social media hate speech that does not entail threats or even
racial epithets. When the targeted social media profile represents the
plaintiffs business, a claim that hate speech defaces the plaintiff's
property is even more likely to succeed given that the social media
account represents the plaintiffs business property on the World Wide
Web like a virtual sign.
As Washington D.C. and Massachusetts do not have "Intimidation
Based on Bigotry or Bias" statutes, the liability of brendmaitland,
RealSteezyDubz, and Grizzlymarshall under this cause of action is
doubtful and will depend on whether the plaintiff could establish
jurisdiction in a venue, such as the defendants' home state, that has such
a statute. Supposing that the plaintiff has established jurisdiction in
Ohio over all three defendants, then brendmaitland and RealSteezyDubz
could be found liable due to their threatening tweets if the tweets made
Ward believe that he was at risk of physical violence. It is unlikely,
97. See Citron, supra note 4, at 113; Laura Pfeiffer, To Enhance or Not to Enhance: Civil
Penalty Enhancementfor Parents ofJuvenile Hate Crime Offenders, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 1685, 1696-97

(2007).
98. OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
99. Id. §2307.70(B)(1).

§§

2307.70(B)(1), 2927.12 (West 2013).
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however, that a claim against Grizzlymarshall would succeed, as the
tweet did not contain a threat and did not mention Ward, which would
make it especially hard to prove that Ward was threatened or that his
property was defaced.
While the availability of "Intimidation Based on Bigotry or Bias"
statutes will vary from state to state, they nevertheless provide a strong
possibility for civil liability of speakers of hate speech in social media.
"Intimidation Based on Bigotry or Bias" statutes could cover social
media hate speech threats that are not serious enough to constitute IIED,
and could also possibly be used to combat hate speech that would not
constitute defamation or threats but nevertheless defaces the plaintiffs
social media profile. Furthermore, some of these statutes, like Ohio's,
may provide limited liability against the parents of minors espousing
social media hate speech. As the public becomes more unwilling to
accept hate speech, more states should be adopting these statutes in the
future, providing a promising future for combatting hate speech in social
media.
D. 42 U.S.C. § 1981
1. Discussion on 42 U.S.C. § 1981
Plaintiffs may be able to utilize 42 U.S.C § 1981 to establish a cause
of action when defendants interfere with their ability to enter into
contracts because of their race.100 A § 1981 claim, unlike a 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 claim, does not require state action and is actionable against
private parties.101 At least one court has upheld damages where masked
men used intimidation to inhibit racial minorities from pursuing their
livelihoods.1 02
Ensuring justice and compensation for loss of
employment or business due to hate speech on a minority's commercial
or personal Facebook or Twitter account directly relates to ensuring
minorities equal contracting power to whites, so if minority plaintiffs
can show that hate speech directed at their social media account lost
them employment or sales, then they may have a viable § 1981 cause of
action.
100. Citron, supra note 4, at 91. Section 1981 states that "[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of
the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce
contracts . .. as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (West 2013).
101. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (holding that § 1981 prohibited racial
discrimination in the making and enforcement of private contracts and did not violate the First
Amendment when African-American plaintiffs sued segregated schools to accept nonwhite students).
102. Vietnamese Fishermen's Ass'n v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 518 F. Supp. 993, 1007
(S.D. Tex. 1981) ("When aliens are the victims of racial or other forms of discrimination actionable
under [§] 1981, they have standing to sue under this section.").
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2. Analysis of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 Claims' Ability to Combat Social
Media Hate Speech
42 U.S.C. § 1981 provides an interesting, although unlikely, avenue
to liability for social media racial hate speech. Threats or hate epithets
could lead to clients or employers viewing victims as conflict prone or
incompetent, which in turn could interfere with the victims' right to
make contracts because of their race-an actionable claim under § 1981.
If the hate speech affects a victim's business's social media page,
§ 1981 could provide a cause of action to pursue the perpetrator, and the
loss of business could amount to substantially more damages than only
personal injury damages. Difficulty will very likely arise, however, in
proving that the hate speech caused the loss in contracts, as well as
proving the specific damages resulting from the hate speech.
Additionally, § 1981 claims are only available for race-based hate
speech.
Pursuing claims against brendmaitland, RealSteezyDubz, or
Grizzlymarshall would therefore be difficult, since it would be hard to
establish that their tweets specifically resulted in less fans coming to
Joel Ward's hockey games or that owners were deterred from
contracting with Joel Ward due to the defendants' specific hate speech.
Nevertheless, testimony that fans avoided Ward's hockey games or that
owners did not contract with Ward because of the increased likelihood
of conflicts or scandal caused by the hate speech surrounding him could
provide a basis for § 1981 claims against brendmaitland,
RealSteezyDubz, and Grizzlymarshall. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 therefore
provides a possible, although unlikely, cause of action against social
media hate speech.
E. Recommendationsfor Legislatures to Provide Causes ofAction
Allowing LiabilityAgainst Social Media Hate Speech Perpetrators

In 1982, Richard Delgado called for an independent tort to be
instituted for racial slurs,' 0 3 and the need for such a cause of action has
not abided. R.A. V v. City of St. Paul, however, calls into question the
constitutionality of such a law, as categories of speech such as
defamation can be regulated because of its constitutionally proscribable
content, but may not be regulated based on hostility towards a message
it contains. 104
Congress has previously considered a bill to prohibit communication
"with the intent to coerce, intimidate, harass, or cause substantial
103. Delgado, supra note 6, at 180.
104. RA.. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 383-84 (1992).
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emotional distress to a person; using electronic means to support severe,
repeated, and hostile behavior," but it did not pass. 0 5 Providing a cause
of action for victims of such crimes may prove more palatable than an
outright criminal ban, and could also help to severely curtail social
media hate speech and cyber bullying.
States should continue to pass "Intimidation Based on Bias or
Bigotry" laws that provide victims with civil remedies, and ensure that
these laws also provide for parental liability for minor offenders. In
doing so, they would not only deter adults, but also ensure that children
are being taught the harms of targeting other people with hate speech.
They are, therefore, crucial to ensuring that hate speech is eradicated
from social media.
V. CONCLUSION: A NEW FORUM FOR ANEW SOCIETY

If law is a reflection of society, then this article has unveiled a
disturbing (but perhaps accurate) picture of America. Most American
courts have found hate speech to be acceptable in our "civilized"
society, despite the rest of the world disagreeing,' 06 and have found
racial epithets to not defame the victim, despite their history and
connotations. The term "fag" is not defamatory because- of the
extremely negative history and animosity it imparts on the victim, but
because being considered homosexual is so frowned upon in our country
that it would project the victim's reputation in a negative light. Victims'
communications are affected by hate speech, but the American judiciary
has chosen to protect the rights of perpetrators rather than the rights of
victims. American courts, perhaps like many American citizens, have
consistently refused to consider the truly horrific impacts of hate speech
and have consistently found hate speech acceptable in American society.
Social media has brought to light new harms caused by hate speech.
When the harms caused by hate speech are exacerbated and magnified
by a new communication forum, they have a much better chance at
being perceived as truly egregious by judges. These judges should be
more reluctant to grant hate speech the acceptability found in other areas
of society to a forum that has profoundly new impacts on receivers of
information, especially when these receivers of information largely
consist of the next generation. Attorneys should press claims against
social media hate speech perpetrators at every opportunity, judges
should be more open minded when considering the effects of hate
speech on victims, and legislatures should continue to enact laws that

105. Lipton, supranote 8, at 1121 (internal quotation marks omitted).
106. See supra text accompanying note 6.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol82/iss3/8

24

Holschuh: #civilrightscybertorts: Utilizing Torts to Combat Hate Speech in

2014] UTILIZING TORIS TO COMBAT HATE SPEECH INONLINE SOCIAL MEDIA 977
provide civil remedies to victims of social media hate speech in order to
ensure that this virulent communication is eventually eradicated from
the marketplace of ideas.
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